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INTRODUCTION

One of the most perplexing questions in modern constitutional
law is when, if ever, regulations of property that do not formally transfer title to the government result in the property being "taken for public use, without just compensation" in violation of the Fifth
Amendment. 2 In 1978, in Penn Central TransportationCo. v. City of New
York, 3 the Supreme Court set forth a framework for inquiry concerning such so-called regulatory takings that considers "the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to
which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed
expectations ... [and] the character of the governmental action. ' 4 A
2 U.S. CONST. amend. V. More precisely, the Fifth Amendment confirms and clarifies that the federal government may not take private property withoutjust compensation. The basic prohibition against uncompensated federal takings is actually found
in the so-called Necessary and Proper Clause-or the Sweeping Clause, as it was
known to the founding generation-which permits Congress to authorize takings of
private property if, but only if, such action is "necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution" federal powers. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. A taking without just compensation
would not be "proper." The Sweeping Clause both authorizes and limits the exercise
of a federal eminent domain power. See Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The
"Proper"Scope of Federal Power: A JurisdictionalInterpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43
DuKE LJ. 267, 270 (1993); Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Taking Notes: Subpoenas and
Just Compensation, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 1081, 1086-87 (1999). The Fifth Amendment
amplifies and emphasizes these limits on federal takings but does not create them.
For more than a century, of course, the federal courts have held that Section 1 of
the Fourteenth Amendment imposes precisely the same limits on state takings of
property as the Takings Clause and Sweeping Clause place on federal takings. See Chi.,
Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897). In this
Article, we accept that conclusion without endorsing it.
3 438 U.S. 104 (1978).

4 Id. at 124.
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year later, in Kaiser Aetna v. United States,5 the Court recast this frame-

work into a three-factor analysis that distinctly considers "the economic impact of the regulation, its interference with reasonable
investment backed expectations, and the character of the government
action."

6

Although the Penn Central formulation, as recast by Kaiser Aetna,
has dominated discussion of takings law for a quarter of a century and
continues to serve as the canonical standard for regulatory takings
analysis, 7 virtually everyone agrees that it serves its function badly.
Some writers may applaud the general pattern of results that emerges
from the Penn Central framework, but the framework itself is almost
universally decried as hopelessly vague, impossible to apply in a consistent fashion, and an invitation to judicial subjectivity. 8 This disdain
for Penn Central unites the strangest of bedfellows: Gideon Kanner, a
long-time champion of property rights, and John Echeverria, an
equally dedicated champion of government regulation, have criticized
the Penn Central framework in strikingly similar terms. 9 Professor
5 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
6 Id. at 175.
7 See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 125 S.Ct. 2074, 2081-82 (2005); TahoeSierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 321 (2002);
Looking Back on Penn Central: A Panel Discussion with the Supreme Court Litigators, 15
FoRDHAM ENvN-L. L. REV. 287, 287 (2004) [hereinafter Looking Back] ("Penn Central...
has become the lodestar of the Court's takings analysis. As people have found in
recent years, woe to the advocate who stands before the Court and tries to suggest a
departure from the Penn Central test." (quoting Richard Lazarus)).
8 For a compendium ofjurisprudential criticisms of the Penn Central framework,
see Gideon Kanner, Making Laws and Sausages: A Quarter Century Retrospective on Penn
Central Transportatoin Co. v. City of New York, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 653,
664-66 (2005); Mark R. Poirier, The Virtue of Vagueness in Takings Doctrine, 24 CARDOZO
L. REV. 93, 97 n.2 (2002). Penn Central's few defenders praise this very vagueness as
an appropriate judicial response to the competing human values at stake in regulatory takings cases. See F. Patrick Hubbard, Palazzolo, Lucas and Penn Central: The
Need for Pragmatism, Symbolism, and Ad Hoc Balancing, 80 NEB. L. REv. 465, 517-18
(2001); Poirier, supra, at 100-02.
9 Compare Gideon Kanner, "Landmark Justice" or "Economic Lunacy"? A Quarter
Centuty Retrospective on Penn Central (decrying Penn Central's "questionable provenance, destabilizing influence on the law, dubious status as precedent, and its substantive shortcomings"), in INVERSE CONDEMNATION AND RELATED GOVERNMENT LIABILITY
379, 381-82 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, Apr. 22-24, 2004), available at WL SJ052 ALIABA 379, with John D. Echeverria, Is the Penn Central Three-Factor-Test Ready for History's Dustbin?, 52 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG. 3, 11 (2000) (declaring that the Penn
Central framework "is not supported by current Supreme Court precedent, invites unprincipled judicial decision making, conflicts with the language and original understanding of the takings clause, would confer unjust windfalls in many cases, and
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Echeverria has forcefully concluded that "[t] he time has come to deposit the three-factor test [from Penn Central] in history's dustbin." 10
Two years before Penn Central, the Supreme Court decided another case involving a three-factor analysis that has generated similar,
and similarly voluminous and vociferous, criticisms. In 1976, in Mathews v. Eldridge,I the Court set forth a three-factor framework for analyzing the constitutional adequacy of procedures under the Due
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.' 2 The due
process inquiry, said the Court,
generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the
private interest that will be affected by the official action; second,
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
13
requirements would entail.
This three-factor framework dominates procedural due process law in
much the same way as, and to much the same extent that, the Penn
Central three-factor framework dominates the regulatory takings inquiry. And the Mathews due process inquiry, like the Penn Centralinquiry, is routinely assailed as unworkable, subjective, incomplete, and
incapable of consistent application. 14 History's dustbin seems to
beckon to Mathews as invitingly as it does to Penn Central.
We worry that the brooms may be coming out too quickly. In our
view, many of the criticisms leveled at both Penn Centraland Mathews
are misdirected because they are based on profound misunderstandings of the purpose and scope of both opinions. It is embarrassingly
easy to demonstrate that the frameworks of Penn Central and Mathews
are dismal failures as tools for making or predicting judicial decisions.
Factors can only determine or predict outcomes if they are commensurable, and the simple fact that neither Penn Centralnor Mathews provides (or could ever have provided) a reliable method for rendering
creates seemingly insurmountable problems in terms of defining an appropriate
remedy").
10 Echeverria, supra note 9, at 11; see also Douglas W. Kmiec, Inserting the Last
Remaining Pieces into the Takings Puzzle, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 995, 995 (1997)
(describing Penn Centralas an "ill fitting piece [ ] left over from other puzzles long ago

forgotten and now deserving abandonment").
11 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
12 U.S. CONsT. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1.
13 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35.
14

See infra text accompanying notes 85-87.
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commensurable and aggregating the various factors that they identify
is enough to prove that those decisions cannot function well as decisionmaking mechanisms. But that does not make the frameworks failures in all possible respects. Frameworks can serve functions other
than determining or predicting outcomes.
We do not believe that the Court in Penn Central and Mathewsand in terms of personnel it was the same Court in both cases-actually thought that it was providing a decisionmaking algorithm for either regulatory takings or due process problems. Rather, we believe
that each opinion had the more modest, but nonetheless important,
ambition of providing a framework or structurefor discussion of the issues
arising in takings and due process law.
In both takings law and due process law, as the doctrine in each
area currently stands, the ultimate touchstone for inquiry is that most
indefinable and context-sensitive of concepts: "fairness." There is no
algorithm for determining fairness in either context, and it makes no
sense to look for one. The most that one can do is to channel the
fairness inquiry in a fashion that lends itself to the stylized arguments
of an adversarial legal culture. Put simply, one needs to tell lawyers
how to write briefs and to tell judges how to write opinions about
"fair" treatment of property owners and "fair" procedures. A properly
constructed framework-whether consisting of two factors, three factors, or more-can in principle serve that modest but significant function even if it is useless as a tool for making or predicting ultimate
decisions.
We are confident that the Penn Central and Mathews Courts did
not have any grander aspirations in mind for these frameworks than
this conversation-shaping function. When viewed in that more limited
fashion, both opinions make a good deal of doctrinal and jurisprudential sense. Moreover, once the functions of the respective
frameworks are understood, it is possible to think about refashioning
those frameworks in a way that better achieves their goals. Accordingly, we come neither to bury the Penn Central and Mathews
frameworks nor to praise them, but to clarify them so that they may
better serve their true jurisprudential aims.
In Part I, we begin with an analysis of Mathews. We situate the
Mathews due process framework within the larger context of procedural due process law and show that the Mathews Court never intended
its formulation to do anything other than provide a structure for argument. Mathews purported only to explain some of the considerations
that had gone into previous judicial determinations concerning procedural fairness and to tell lawyers and judges what kind of language
to use when crafting arguments. Indeed, the Mathews Court did not
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even invent the Mathews three-factor framework. The framework was
suggested by the Solicitor General's brief in the case on behalf of Secretary Mathews and was directly endorsed by the amicus brief filed on
behalf of Eldridge. The Mathews framework was thus the creation of
professional litigators who were simply trying to understand and express what the Court's prior decisions concerning fundamental procedural fairness required. We do not deny that the Court's formulation
of these considerations in Mathews was in some respects infelicitous,
nor do we deny that subsequent decisions, including subsequent Supreme Court decisions, have misapplied that framework by treating it
as a decisionmaking device. But that is not a problem inherent in the
Mathews framework, which can easily be recast to avoid further
misapplications.
In Part II, we use insights drawn from our analysis of Mathews to
show that the Penn Centraltakings framework serves the same conversation-structuring function as does the Mathews inquiry. Again, we do
not deny that courts, including the Supreme Court, have often incorrectly treated the Penn Central framework as a decisionmaking device,
but that is a misapplication of Penn Central rather than an inherent
feature of the opinion's framework. We also note some intriguing
similarities and differences between the Mathews and Penn Central
frameworks that point the way to an appropriate reconstruction of
each.
In Part III, we propose a modest reformulation of the Penn Centralframework as it is currently employed. More precisely, we propose
a restoration of the Penn Centralframework to the form in which it was
originally constructed in 1978. The framework that is now routinely
attributed to Penn Central was not in fact the framework set forth in
Penn Central. The modern framework comes from Kaiser Aetna's recasting of the Penn Centralanalysis, and we regard that recasting as a
giant step backwards in clarity. By splitting off "investment-backed expectations" as an analytical element distinct from the impact of a regulation on the claimant, KaiserAetna set the law on a path of confusion
from which it has not yet recovered. To be sure, the opinion in Penn
Central was written under serious time pressure1 5 and therefore was
not as crisp as it could have been about its aims and methods; it is no
great surprise that Penn Centralwas subsequently misunderstood. But
a return to the Penn Centralframework as it was initially crafted is doctrinally more sensible than current law. We end with brief concluding
remarks.
15

See Looking Back, supra note 7, at 301-02.
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One should be very clear about the scope of this project. We
emphatically do not maintain in this Article that either Penn Central or
Mathews accurately reflects the original meaning of the relevant constitutional provisions or (to the extent that this is a separate inquiry)
represents a normatively attractive resolution of the competing interests that operate in their respective domains. We have nothing to say
here about criticisms of either doctrine that come from those directions. Our point is only that, given the basic contours of the modern
doctrines governing regulatory takings and procedural due process,
Penn Centraland Mathews may deserve more respect than they usually
get in the academy. As a doctrinaland jurisprudentialmatter, they simply are not as bad as many people seem to think.
I.

REDISCOVERING MATHEWS V. ELDRiDGE

Mathews v. Eldridge'6 dominates modem procedural due process
law. There are some instances in which due process cases are decided
without reference to the Mathews framework, 17 but they are self-conscious exceptions to the general rule. Along with Board of Regents of
State Colleges v. Roth,' 8 Mathews is arguably one of the two most important procedural due process cases of the modem era.
Mathews, of course, was decided 185 years after ratification of the
Fifth Amendment. Whatever Mathews's contribution to the law may
have been, the country got along without that contribution for quite
some time. Thus, in order to understand Mathews's proper place in
the due process firmament, one must understand what happened during those 185 years before it was birthed-and in particular one must
understand the unanswered questions about procedural due process
law that faced the Supreme Court in 1976.
A.

Some ProceduralFundamentals

The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid the federal and state governments, respectively, from depriving persons of life, liberty, or property "without due process of
law." 19 When governmental deprivations occur, exactly what process
of law is due, and from whom?
The Due Process Clauses are paradigmatically checks on executive and judicial conduct, as befitting their origins in Article 39 of the
16
17

424 U.S. 319.
See, e.g., Dusenberry v. United States, 534 U.S. 161 (2002).

18

408 U.S. 564 (1972).

19

U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1.
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Magna Carta.2 0 The most important function of the Due Process
Clauses is to codify the basic idea, known as the principle of legality, that
executive and judicial deprivations are permissible only when authorized by positive law. 21

Legislatures are not a primary target of the

principle of legality; indeed, it is legislative action that generally provides the necessary authorization for executive or judicial
deprivations.
But the Due Process Clauses also regulate the procedural forms by
which deprivations take place, even when those forms are prescribed
22
by legislation. In Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.,
the Supreme Court's first decision involving the procedural reach of
the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, the Court declared that
it was not left to the legislative power to enact any process which
might be devised. The article is a restraint on the legislative as well
as on the executive and judicial powers of the government, and cannot be so construed as to leave congress free to make any process
23
"due process of law," by its mere will.
Thus, if the legislature purported to authorize executive or judicial
deprivations without, for example, notice to the affected party, the
deprivation's legislative pedigree would not insulate the deprivation
from a due process challenge.
So when are procedures-whether crafted by legislatures, executives, or courts-less than what is due? As the Court pointedly observed in Murray's Lessee in 1856, "[t]he constitution contains no
description of those processes which it was intended to allow or forbid. It does not even declare what principles are to be applied to
ascertain whether it be due process." 24 Thus, said the Court,
we must look to those settled usages and modes of proceeding existing in the common and statute law of England, before the emigration of our ancestors, and which are shown not to have been
unsuited to their civil and political condition by having been acted
25
on by them after the settlement of this country.
20 Article 39, the forerunner of the Due Process Clauses, declared in 1215 that
"[n]o free man shall be arrested or imprisoned, or disseised or outlawed or exiled or
in any way victimised, neither will we attack him or send anyone to attack him, except
by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land." Magna Carta, reprinted
in RALPH V. TURNER, MAGNA CARTA, app. at 231 (Harry Rothwell, Trans., 2003). The
King, in other words, could not act against freemen without prior legal authorization.
21

See GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE

22
23
24
25

59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856).
Id. at 276.
Id.
Id.

LAW

631-32 (3d ed. 2004).
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Those "settled usages and modes of proceeding," or traditions,
afford some clear answers to some easy cases. A criminal defendant
can only be permanently deprived of life, liberty, or property after a
full-dress trial, complete with a jury if the defendant so wishes. 26 The
jury trial, with a neutral judge as the arbiter, 27 represents the highest
form of procedural protection against governmental action recognized in the American legal system. At the other extreme, deprivations effected by legislation require only the procedures specified by
the Constitution for valid legislative action, such as bicameralism and
presentment 28 (or the equivalent formalities under any relevant state
constitution); they do not require prior notice, opportunities for hearings, or other procedural devices familiar from the judicial or executive context. The process that is due for a deprivation depends to a
considerable extent on the nature of the governmental body that is
doing the depriving.
Reference to "settled usages and modes of proceeding," however,
does not always provide an easy answer. What happens, for instance,
when deprivations take the form neither of validly enacted legislation
nor of formal judicial proceedings? Many deprivations occur through
administrative actions, ranging from the arrest and detention of criminal suspects to the suspension of licenses to the seizure of property
alleged to be contraband. If executive administrators step into the
constitutional shoes of judges, they can only effect these deprivations
through full-blown judicial trials. If they step into the constitutional
shoes of legislators, they can proceed with no procedural formality
whatsoever. If they step into the constitutional shoes of neither, then
"settled usages and modes of proceeding" may be of little help in figuring out the requirements of due process.
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court
rejected both the judicial and the legislative analogies for administrative deprivations. Londoner v. City and County of Denver29 concerned a
tax for local improvements assessed by the City of Denver against landowners who supposedly would benefit from the improvements.
26 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3; id. amend. VI; Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct.
2633, 2661 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting). For more than a century, this principle has
not applied to so-called petty crimes, where the penalty involves fewer than six
months imprisonment. See Eugene Volokh, Crime Severity and ConstitutionalLine-Drawing, 90 VA. L. REv. 1957, 1971-72 (2004); Jeff E. Butler, Note, Petty Offenses, Serious
Consequences: Multiple Petty Offenses and the Sixth Amendment Right toJuiy Trial, 94 MICH.
L. REv. 872 (1995).
27 See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 522-23 (1927).
28 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cls. 2-3.
29 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
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Before the tax was finally assessed, the landowners were allowed to file
written objections to the city council's proposed allocation of the costs
among the various landowners but had no opportunity to appear in
person before the city council.3 0 Had the tax been imposed by the
Colorado state legislature, there would have been no due process issue, as the Due Process Clauses impose no specific procedural requirements on legislatures. The state legislature could have assessed
the tax without notice-and a fortiori without a hearing.3 1 And had
liability equivalent to the tax been the result of a judicial proceeding,
the procedures afforded the landowners would obviously have been
inadequate.
The Denver city council, however, was neither the state legislature nor a court; it was an administrative body exercising delegated
authority from the state legislature. The Supreme Court held that, at
least when a relatively small number of persons are affected,3 2 such an
administrative body does not stand in the place of the legislature for
due process purposes, 33 nor does it have to provide all of the procedures required for lawful judicial action.3 4 Instead, said the Court, a
litigant in the position of the landowners "shall have the right to support his allegations by argument however brief, and, if need be, by
proof, however informal. ' 35 The plaintiffs in Londonerwere not entitled to anything resembling a formal adjudication under the Adminis30 See id. at 380-81. There were also a number of preliminary steps before the tax
was assessed, including a resolution for the work proposed by the Board of Public
Works and enactment of an ordinance authorizing the work. No procedures were
constitutionally necessary for these preliminary steps because none of them resulted
in a deprivation of life, liberty, or property. They were essential parts of a process that
would ultimately lead to a deprivation (the tax), but only the deprivation itself constitutionally required procedures. See id. at 378-79.
31 See Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. No. 108, 111 U.S. 701, 709-10 (1884).
32 Seven years after the decision in Londoner, the Court held that administrative
bodies do in fact step into the constitutional shoes of the legislature when they act in
a broad, rule-like fashion. See Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of Colo.,
239 U.S. 441, 445-46 (1915).

33 See Londoner, 210 U.S. at 385-86 ("But where the legislature of a State, instead
of fixing the tax itself, commits to some subordinate body the duty of determining
whether, in what amount, and upon whom it shall be levied, and of making its assessment and apportionment, due process of law requires that at some stage of the proceedings before the tax becomes irrevocably fixed, the taxpayer shall have an
opportunity to be heard, of which he must have notice, either personal, by publication, or by a law fixing the time and place of the hearing.").
34 See id. at 386 ("Many requirements essential in strictly judicial proceedings may
be dispensed with in proceedings of this nature.").
35

Id.
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trative Procedure Act, 36 but they were entitled at least to some kind of
informal give-and-take, including an opportunity to address the city
3 7
council in person.
Conspicuously absent from the opinion in Londoner was any explanation for why that particular procedural package, among the myriad procedural sets that one can imagine, was legally required. One
can understand why the Court would not want to treat every administrative body as either a legislature or a court, which would set up a
stark feast-or-famine dichotomy between no procedures and a fulldress trial, 38 but one then has to specify where in the vast range between those two poles the procedures in any given case must fall.
Londoner simply announced its result without providing any principles
or guidance for future determinations.
The late nineteenth-century cases that preceded Londoner had
provided little more explanation for their decisions. One of the
Court's earliest post-Murray's Lessee pronouncements on due process
specifically declined to set forth any broad principles for determining
adequate procedures in cases not clearly governed by tradition, on the
ground that "there is wisdom, we think, in ... the gradual process of
judicial inclusion and exclusion, as the cases presented for decision
shall require." 39 Shortly thereafter, the Court explained that "by 'due
process' is meant one which, following the forms of law, is appropriate
to the case, and just to the parties to be affected." 40 Evidently, the
Court was simply feeling its way in each case to whatever procedures
seemed, taking all things into account, fair under the circumstances.
Five years after Londoner, the Court expressly confirmed that the Due
Process Clauses indeed forbid procedures that are "inadequate or
41
manifestly unfair."
Subsequent twentieth-century decisions did not clarify the appropriate standard for procedural adequacy-and indeed strongly rein36 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-557 (2000) (describing the trial-type procedures required
for on-the-record federal administrative hearings).
37 Nearly three-quarters of a century later, this kind of informal hearing with an
opportunity for face-to-face contact would come to be known as a "Goss hearing." See
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
38 Modern administrative law does, at least formally, set up this kind of dichotomy through the Administrative Procedure Act's stark distinction between formal and
informal procedural modes. See LAWSON, supra note 21, at 196-98. Of course, the
rise of hybrid rulemaking (and, to a lesser extent, hybrid adjudication) has narrowed
somewhat the distance between formal and informal proceedings. See id. at 277.
39 Davidson v. City of New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 104 (1877).
40 Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. No. 108, 111 U.S. 701, 708 (1884).
41 Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 227 U.S. 88,
91 (1913).

NOTRE

DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 8 1: 1

forced the idea that no such unitary standard is available because the
touchstone of procedural adequacy is fairness to the affected parties,
which necessarily requires a case-sensitive inquiry. In Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Committee v. McGrath,42 decided in 1951, a badly splintered fiveJustice majority that produced five separate opinions held that the
United States Attorney General had not been given power by executive order to designate organizations as Communist without a hearing.
Justice Frankfurter penned a long, rambling, and ultimately very influential concurrence that discoursed at considerable length about procedural due process and the "deep-rooted demands of fair play"43 that
it embodies but which ultimately said little of substance about the
mechanism through which one ought to resolve procedural disputes. 44 Justice Frankfurter, as with the Justices before him, strongly

42
43
44

341 U.S. 123 (1951).
Id. at 161 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
See, e.g., id. at 162-63 (citations omitted).
The requirement of "due process" is not a fair weather or timid assurance. It must be respected in periods of calm and in times of trouble; it
protects aliens as well as citizens. But "due process," unlike some legal rules,
is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place
and circumstances. Expressing as it does in its ultimate analysis respect enforced by law for that feeling of just treatment which has been evolved
through centuries of Anglo-American constitutional history and civilization,
"due process" cannot be imprisoned within the treacherous limits of any
formula. Representing a profound attitude of fairness between man and
man, and more particularly between the individual and government, "due
process" is compounded of history, reason, the past course of decisions, and
stout confidence in the strength of the democratic faith which we profess.
Due process is not a mechanical instrument. It is not a yardstick. It is a
process. It is a delicate process of adjustment inescapably involving the exercise of judgment by those whom the Constitution entrusted with the unfolding of the process.
It may fairly be said that, barring only occasional and temporary lapses,
this Court has not sought unduly to confine those who have the responsibility of governing by giving the great concept of due process doctrinaire
scope. The Court has responded to the infinite variety and perplexity of the
tasks of government by recognizing that what is unfair in one situation may
be fair in another. Whether the ex parte procedure to which the petitioners
were subjected duly observed "the rudiments of fair play," cannot, therefore,
be tested by mere generalities or sentiments abstractly appealing. The precise nature of the interest that has been adversely affected, the manner in
which this was done, the reasons for doing it, the available alternatives to the
procedure that was followed, the protection implicit in the office of the functionary whose conduct is challenged, the balance of hurt complained of and
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resisted any attempt to reduce constitutional procedural adequacy to
any set formula or predetermined criteria other than basic fairness.
Ten years later, in Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473
v. McElroy,45 the Court roundly declared that "l[t] he very nature of due
process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation," so that "consideration of what
procedures due process may require under any given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the
government function involved as well as of the precise nature of the
'46
private interest that has been affected by the governmental action.
The case ultimately turned on whether the plaintiff had been deprived of a constitutionally protected interest at all, so there was no
specific discussion of the particular procedures to which she might
have been entitled.
47
In 1970, nearly a decade later, the Court in Goldberg v. Kelly
held for the first time that deprivation of certain governmental benefits-in this case a form of welfare benefits-had to be preceded by
highly formalized procedures akin to a formal adjudication. 48 The
Court's discussion ranged widely over the plaintiffs' need for continuing receipt of benefits, 49 the government's concerns about policing
fraud in the program, 50 and the "capacities and circumstances of
those who are to be heard," 5 1 but the opinion did not provide any
general principles to guide the process of formulating adequate procedures. Rather, Goldbergs procedural mandate was tailored to the
Court's perception of the abilities, limitations, and conditions of the
terminated recipients, and the Court explicitly noted that "[t]he extent to which procedural due process must be afforded the recipient..., depends upon whether the recipient's interest in avoiding...
52
loss outweighs the governmental interest in summary adjudication."
As in Londoner more than sixty years before, the Court announced a
result without providing much insight into the process by which that
result was reached.
good accomplished-these are some of the considerations that must enter
into the judicial judgment.
Id. (citations omitted).
45 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
46 Id. at 895.
47 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
48 See id. at 263-64.
49

See id. at 264.

50
51
52

See id. at 265-66.
Id. at 268-69.
Id. at 262-63.
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Similar considerations were at work in 1972 in Morrissey v.
Brewer.53 After holding that parole revocations effected a deprivation
of "liberty" within the meaning of the Due Process Clauses, 54 the
Court set forth a detailed set of procedures that requires at least six
elements for a constitutionally proper hearing. 55 But, as in Goldberg,
although the Court's discussion of the requirements of due process
was quite lengthy, 56 almost all of that discussion simply identified and
described the particular procedures that were thought to be required
in the case at hand. There was nothing to suggest that any set of general principles or considerations controlled the analysis.
The law of procedural due process thus entered the last quarter
of the twentieth century in much the same way that it had left the last
quarter of the nineteenth: "by 'due process' is meant one which, following the forms of law, is appropriate to the case, and just to the
parties to be affected." 5 7 The ultimate inquiry with respect to due process remained, as it had always been, a search for what procedures are
fair under the circumstances of each particular case.
There are two very large potential problems with this legal formulation of the requirements of "due process of law": a problem of substance and a problem of form. Substantively, by its nature a "fairness"
test for procedural adequacy is difficult to apply and spawns uncertainty. Small differences in facts, including differences in facts about
the specific plaintiffs or defendants in particular cases, can make large
differences in outcomes, so it is hard to project future decisions from
past determinations. There is no way to address this problem, however, without changing the basic terms of the substantive inquiry.
Once it is accepted that fairness determines procedural adequacyand the Court has been very consistent about that conclusion for a
century and a half-one simply has to live with a certain degree of
unpredictability in those determinations.
53 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
54 Id. at 481-82.
55 Id. at 489 (finding that the minimum requirements of due process in this context "include (a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to
the parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to
present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and crossexamine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for
not allowing confrontation); (e) a 'neutral and detached' hearing body such as a
traditional parole board, members of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers;
and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons
for revoking parole").
56 See id. at 483-90.
57 Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. No. 108, 111 U.S. 701, 708 (1884).
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The formal problem is more pertinent to our story. Assume that
everyone understands and accepts that the constitutional due process
inquiry focuses on fairness to the parties under the circumstances of
each case. Everyone accordingly understands and accepts that application of this principle will be difficult and unpredictable. People still
need to be able to formulate arguments. Lawyers have to be able to
construct arguments about procedural fairness within the conventions
of the adversarial legal system, and judges (and administrators) must
be able to write opinions about due process problems that conform to
professional norms. Even if the ultimate inquiry in the case involves
nothing more substantial than an ultimately subjective, all-things-considered judgment about fairness, the expectations of the legal culture
require that advocates and decisionmakers be able to express that
judgment in some objectified manner. Due process law requires a
common language by which legal actors can talk to each other about
fairness.
That is where Mathews v. Eldridge58 entered the scene.
B.

The Lingua Franca of ProceduralLaw

George Eldridge was awarded Social Security disability benefits by
a hearing examiner in Virginia on June 8, 1968.59 Nearly four years
later, the state agency that administered the Social Security disability
program in Virginia determined that Eldridge had medically improved, was able to work, and was no longer entitled to disability benefits. The Federal Bureau of Disability Insurance of the Social Security
Administration approved the state decision, and Eldridge's benefits
ceased after July 1972.
The state review process involved notice to Eldridge, receipt and
review of evidence of Eldridge's medical condition, and several opportunities for Eldridge to provide written material that he considered
relevant to his case. 60 Eldridge challenged the constitutional adequacy of these procedures on the ground that, as with the plaintiffs in
Goldberg, he should have been granted a full evidentiary hearing, com58 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
59 The district court opinion stated that benefits were awarded on June 2, 1968.
Eldridge v. Weinberger, 361 F. Supp. 520, 521 (W.D. Va. 1973), affd, 493 F.2d. 1230
(4th Cir. 1974), rev'd sub nom. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319. Eldridge's counsel
alleged that the benefits were awarded on June 8, 1968. Brief for the Respondent at
2, Mathews, 424 U.S. 319 (No. 74-204), 1975 WL 173411. The Supreme Court deftly
avoided the controversy over the correct date. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 323 ("Respondent Eldridge was first awarded benefits in June 1968."). We assume (for no reason
that we can defend) that Eldridge's counsel was correct.
60 See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 323-24.
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plete with oral participation and cross-examination of witnesses, prior
to the termination of his benefits. 6 1 The United States countered that
Social Security disability benefits were different enough from benefits
under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program (AFDC)
at issue in Goldberg (and the Old Age Assistance program at issue in a
companion case to Goldberg62) to require different procedures for termination. In the district court, the government asserted three basic
differences between Eldridge's situation and the situation of the plaintiffs in Goldberg AFDC benefits are based on need while Social Security disability benefits are not, so that deprivation of the latter is less
serious than deprivation of the former;6 3 Social Security disability benefits decisions are based on objective medical evidence rather than the
"'rumor and gossip"' that might form the basis for an adverse AFDC
decision, so that oral hearings were therefore less useful in disability
benefits cases; 64 and the massive Social Security disability system
would be seriously disrupted if pre-termination hearings were gener65
ally required.
The district court responded in detail to each of the government's proffered distinctions, 66 rejected all of them, and held that a
pre-termination evidentiary hearing was constitutionally required.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in a brief order that
simply adopted the reasoning of the district court. 67 The United
States sought certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted.
The Solicitor General's merits brief in the Supreme Court acknowledged that the ultimate due process inquiry focused on fairness:
61 Everyone agreed that Eldridge's benefits constituted "property" protected by
the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See id. at 332.
62 See Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U.S. 280 (1970).
63 Weinberger, 361 F. Supp. at 523 ("It is argued that in the case of welfare recipients 'need' was the legal criterion for benefits ....

By contrast, according to the

Secretary, the legal criterion for Title II disability benefits is whether the beneficiary
continues to be 'unable to engage in substantial gainful activity,' which obtains irrespective of need.").
64 Id. at 524 ("Defendant next argues that the nature of the evidence involved in
the case of a disability recipient ('medical reports of highly probative value') justifies a
different due process standard than in the case of welfare recipients where 'rumor
and gossip' are more likely to form the basis of an adverse decision.").
65 Id. at 525 ("The Secretary's final argument in support of his position that a
pre-termination hearing should not be required for disability recipients is that to require such hearings would result in vast disruption of the Social Security System.").
66 See id. at 523-27.
67 Eldridge v. Weinberger, 493 F.2d 1230 (4th Cir. 1974), rev'd sub nom. Mathews
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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The procedures for terminating Social Security disability benefits provide an adequate and fair opportunity for a beneficiary to
submit all relevant information necessary to enable the Social Security Administration to make an informed and reliable judgment
whether the disability has ceased .

. .

. The procedures by which

68
disability benefits are now terminated are fair and they work.

The government also acknowledged the flexible and multifaceted
character of the basic fairness inquiry. 69 But in order to structure the
inquiry for purposes of legal argumentation, the government offered
the following observation:
The Court has identified three general interests that must be
assessed in determining the constitutional sufficiency of procedures
for denying or terminating constitutionally-protected interests.
They are: first, the nature of the property (or liberty) interest of
which a person is assertedly being deprived; second, the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used; and third, the administrative burdens and costs that particular
procedural requirements would entail.7 0
The bulk of the government's argument elaborated upon the application of the specific interests identified in this passage to Eldridge's
circumstances.
Five features of the government's proposed formulation of the
due process inquiry are noteworthy. First, the above-quoted paragraph from the government's brief is the obvious source of the threefactor framework adopted by the Court in the Mathews opinion. The
Supreme Court quite clearly did not invent the Mathews v. Eldridge
three-factor analysis. The analysis was invented by attorneys in the Solicitor General's office and was then taken up by the Court.
Second, the government's brief gives every indication that it is
simply trying to describe, in lawyerly language, the considerations that
the Court's prior opinions had identified as relevant for assessing the
ultimate fairness of procedures in a given context. Each of the factors
is traced to a prior Court decision, and the more elaborate discussion
that follows in the brief further tracks each factor through antecedent
71
decisions.
68 Brief for the Petitioner at 34-35, Mathews, 424 U.S. 319 (No. 74-204), 1975 WL
173410.
69 Id. at 35 (citing, inter alia, Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)).
70 Id. at 35-36 (citations omitted).
71 See id. at 37-38 (describing cases that treated the importance of the private
interest as relevant to the scope of required procedures); id. at 39-40 (describing
cases that treated the risk of error as relevant -to the scope of required procedures);
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Third, the amicus brief of the AFL-CIO filed on behalf of Eldridge agreed entirely with the Solicitor General's account of the
72
proper structure for due process inquiry:
The Secretary states that the interests to be assessed in determining when an evidentiary prior hearing is constitutionally required are:
First, the nature of the property.. interest of which a person
is assertedly being deprived... ; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used... ; and third, the administrative burdens and costs that
particular procedural requirement would entail.
We agree. For, these are the very factors upon which the
Goldberg Court predicated its conclusion that an evidentiary prior
hearing is the pre-condition for a cut-off of welfare....
Thus the governing principles are well settled. The crux of the
controversy here is whether the Secretary's soothing assurances that
the "procedures now followed in terminating Social Security disability benefits are fair, and [that] they work," prove out, or whether his
arguments are nothing more than a carefully contrived illusion designed to create the appearance of a system that comports with the
Constitution.

73

No one in Mathews argued that the Solicitor General had somehow
misrepresented the applicable law or omitted any crucial factors from
the analysis.
Fourth, the three factors identified as relevant by the Solicitor
General tracked precisely the three considerations that the government believed supported its case in Mathews. As was made clear by the
district court opinion in Mathews, the government sought to distinguish Eldridge's situation from that of the plaintiffs in Goldberg on the
basis of the alleged lower value of the private interest at stake, the
character of the evidence at issue in Mathews, and the disruption to
the massive Social Security disability program that would result from
id. at 45-46 (describing cases that treated the consequences of procedural formality
as relevant to the scope of required procedures).
72 The merits brief filed directly on behalf of Eldridge did not really have much
of interest to say about the appropriate due process inquiry, either in general or in
Eldridge's specific case. The brief was very short, poorly organized, and soft on substance. The AFL-CIO's brief was considerably more sophisticated, which is unsurprising considering the organization's repeat-player status in the Court. See Brief for the
AFL-CIO as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Mathews, 424 U.S. 319 (No. 74204), 1975 WL 173413.
73 Id. at 5-6 (citations omitted).
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excessive proceduralization. The government's articulation of the
considerations relevant to the due process analysis in its brief in Mathews was clearly dictated by the government's specific litigating interest in that case. Put as simply as possible: the Solicitor General in
74
Mathews was not trying to shape, or re-shape, due process law. He
was trying to win a case.
Fifth, the government identified "the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used" as the principle
value of procedures because it thought that it could establish that oral
hearings would contribute little to the accuracy of Social Security disability determinations, given the character of the evidence that is normally at issue in such cases. Put simply, the government emphasized
decisional accuracy because it was confident that focus on decisional
accuracy would lead to a favorable result on the specific facts of Mathews. As a more general proposition, reducing substantive error is
obviously one important function, and perhaps even the primary function, of procedures. Whether it is the sole function of procedures
probably is not something to which the Solicitor General's office devoted much thought.
The Supreme Court in Mathews adopted the government's argument almost in toto, both with respect to the appropriate framework
for analysis and with respect to the particularized assessment of the
factors in Eldridge's case. The crucial passage in which the Court accepted the government's three-factor framework reads in relevant
part:
In recent years this Court increasingly has had occasion to consider the extent to which due process requires an evidentiary hearing prior to the deprivation of some type of property interest even if
such a hearing is provided thereafter. In only one case, Goldberg v.
Kelly, has the Court held that a hearing closely approximating ajudicial trial is necessary. In other cases requiring some type of
pretermination hearing as a matter of constitutional right the Court
has spoken sparingly about the requisite procedures....
These decisions underscore the truism that "'[d]ue process,'
unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed
content unrelated to time, place and circumstances." "[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands." Accordingly, resolution of the issue
whether the administrative procedures provided here are constitutionally sufficient requires analysis of the governmental and private
interests that are affected. More precisely, our prior decisions indi74 The Solicitor General at that time was Robert Bork, so the pronoun "he" is
descriptive, not generic.
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cate that identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private
interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of
an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would
75
entail.
There is nothing in this passage that suggests that the Court had ambitions beyond those of the Solicitor General or the AFL-CIO. The parties were simply trying to find some framework with which to structure
their arguments about the basic fairness of the procedures employed
by the government. The Court accepted as settled law that basic fairness is the ultimate inquiry, that due process requires a particularized,
case-specific inquiry into fairness, that private and public interests
must be considered, and that past decisions establish that the three
factors identified by the government "generally" are important to the
ultimate inquiry. None of this should be remotely controversial.
None of this suggests that the three articulated factors, which just happened to be the factors thought by the government to be most relevant to the disposition of Eldridge's case, are the only factors relevant
to the basic fairness inquiry. None of this suggests that the three-part
framework somehow displaces the ultimate inquiry into fairness
rather than simply structuring that inquiry into language that lawyers
and decisionmakers can employ.
If the Mathews decision accomplishes anything other than disposing of Eldridge's case on its facts, it merely sets out a framework in
which legal actors can speak to each other about fairness. The language setting forth that framework is not meant to be exclusive; it is
meant to be facilitative of clear analysis in a large run of cases. Properly employed, the Mathews factors can effectively serve that function
of letting people talk about fairness in terms that lend themselves to
adversarial legal argumentation, as all of the factors identified in Mathews are at least potentially relevant to an assessment of fair procedures. Anyone who tries to do more with the Mathews framework
simply does not understand its origins or limitations.

75

Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333-35 (citations omitted).

2005]

"OH LORD,

PLEASE

C.

DON'T LET ME

BE MISUNDERSTOOD!"

21

MisunderstandingMathews

Early Supreme Court decisions after Mathews (properly) identified the three-factor framework as merely a useful tool of analysis. 7 6 It
did not take long, however, before the Court began describing, and
using, the Mathews framework as a "test"-that is, as a tool for reaching decisions rather than simply for expressing in legal language the
rationale for decisions reached through an assessment of basic fairness. By 1979, for example, the Court could say that "[t]he parties
agree that our prior holdings have set out a generalapproachfor testing
challenged state procedures under a due process claim. '7 7 By 1981, the
transformation of the Mathews formulation from a framework for discussion into a decisionmaking algorithm was complete. In a case involving the right to appointed counsel in a civil case, the Court
explained:
The case of Mathews v. Eldridge propounds three elements to be
evaluated in deciding what due process requires ....

We must bal-

ance these elements against each other, and then set their net
weight in the scales against the presumption that there is a right to
appointed counsel only where the indigent, if he is unsuccessful,
78
may lose his personal freedom.
Modern cases continue to treat the Mathews v. Eldridge three-factor formulation as a decisionmaking test, 79 as exemplified by the 2004
decision in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,8 0 in which the Court held that an
American citizen held as an enemy combatant must be given "a fair
opportunity to rebut the Government's factual assertions before a
neutral decisionmaker"8 1 :
The ordinary mechanism that we use for balancing such serious competing interests, and for determining the procedures that
are necessary to ensure that a citizen is not "deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law," is the test that we articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge. Mathews dictates that the process due in
any given instance is determined by weighing "the private interest
that will be affected by the official action" against the Government's
asserted interest, "including the function involved" and the burdens
the Government would face in providing greater process. The Ma76 See, e.g., Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 17 (1978); Smith
v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 848-49 (1977); Dixon v.
Love, 431 U.S. 105, 112-13 (1977); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 675 (1977).
77 Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 599 (1979) (emphasis added).
78 Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) (citation omitted).
79 See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. David, 538 U.S. 715, 716-17 (2003).
80 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (plurality opinion).
81 Id. at 2648.
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thews calculus then contemplates a judicious balancingof those concerns,

through an analysis of "the risk of an erroneous deprivation" of the
private interest if the process were reduced and the "probable value,
82
if any, of additional or substitute safeguards."

Modern scholars likewise generally treat the Mathews framework as
though it were an outcome-determinative test.8 3 The Court also
seems to have accepted the idea that the sole justification for procedures is "to minimize the risk of erroneous decisions,"8 4 although
5
there have been occasional dissenting voices on that score.
Critics have, with considerable justification, roundly attacked the
Mathews framework's efficacy as a decisionmaking tool. Some have
pointed out that one can only weigh factors against each other if the
factors are commensurable, s 6 which the Mathews factors do not appear to be. As one critic has stated, "[t]his reliance upon 'weight,'

which is a useful approach for dealing with bananas, leaves something

87
to be desired where factors such as those in Mathews are concerned.
Others have criticized the narrow focus on decisional accuracy that
the Mathews framework seems to require. Jerry Mashaw has famously
argued that by identifying decisional accuracy as the holy grail of due
process law, the Mathews formulation disregards the important value
that individuals place on being heard: "a lack of personal participation causes alienation and a loss of that dignity and self-respect that

82
83

Id. at 2646 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
See, e.g., Emily Buss, The Missed Opportunity in Gault, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 39, 47

n.37 (2003); Charles H. Koch, Jr., A Community of Interest in the Due Process Calculus, 37
Hous. L. REv. 635, 641-42 (2000); Martin H. Redish & EricJ. Beste, PersonalJurisdiction and the Global Resolution of Mass Tort Litigation: Defining the ConstitutionalBoundaries, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 917, 950-51 (1995); Lawrence B. Solum, ProceduralJustice,
78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 253 (2004).
84 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979); see also Greenholz v. Inmates of
the Neb. Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 13 (1979) ("The function of legal
process, as that concept is embodied in the Constitution ....is to minimize the risk of
erroneous decisions.").
85 See Marshall v.Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980); Greenholz, 442 U.S. at 34
(Marshall, J., dissenting in part) ("Finally, apart from avoiding the risk of actual error,
this Court has stressed the importance of adopting procedures that preserve the appearance of fairness ....").
86 For general discussions of problems of commensurability in the law, see Matthew Adler, Incommensurabilityand Cost-Benefit Analysis, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1371 (1998);
Gary Lawson, Efficiency and Individualism, 42 DuKE L.J. 53 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein,
Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779 (1994).
87 Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the AdministrativeState, 72 CAL. L. REV. 1044,
1138 (1984).
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society properly deems independently valuable." 8 Others have similarly criticized the Mathews framework as too narrowly focused on accuracy at the expense of other potential values.8 9
All of these criticisms of Mathews have merit, but none of the developments in the evolution of Mathews that spawned these criticisms
were inevitable. Mathews does not have to be viewed as anything other
than a potentially useful way of structuring dialogue about fairness, in
which case criticisms of Mathews for failing to direct or predict decisions are misplaced. Nor must Mathews be construed to constrict the
perceived value of procedures solely to their ability to reduce the risk
of erroneous substantive decisions. One could, of course, independently reach the conclusion that procedures are only valuable for
their role in reaching correct substantive outcomes, but nothing in
Mathews compels that result. If Mathews is best viewed solely as a means
for starting (not finishing) a stylized legal conversation about fairness,
it should be judged on those terms.
Does the Mathews formulation do a serviceable job of providing a
common frame of reference for legal argumentation? We think that
it does. It would fail in that task if the factors that it identified were
wildly inappropriate to the ultimate inquiry, which they clearly are
not. It would also fail in that task if the factors themselves were so
vague that they could not serve as a tool for communication. We do
not see that problem either. Mathews has many critics, but we do not
see the critics complaining that they do not know what the Mathews
factors mean. Quite to the contrary, the critics know exactly what the
Mathews factors are getting at and don't like it one bit. Mathews is a
perfectly respectable jurisprudential and doctrinal vehicle for promoting adversarial dialogue about fairness.
The process by which Mathews was transformed from a device for
facilitating discussion into an outcome-determinative test is to some
extent understandable-formulations tend to take on lives of their
own independently of their terms or justifications-but it is also regrettable. A great deal of scholarly and judicial time and energy has
been spent on problems that need never have arisen. Nonetheless,
the process has valuable lessons for understanding what has happened
with the law of regulatory takings, to which we now turn.
88 Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court'sDue Process Calculusfor Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L.

REv. 28, 50 (1976).
89 See, e.g., Cynthia Farina, Conceiving Due Process, 3
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(1991); Koch, supra note 83;Jane Rutherford, The Myth of Due Process, 72 B.U. L. REV.
1, 44 (1992); James G. Wilson, Surveying the Forms of Doctrine on the Bright Line-Balancing
Test Continuum, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 773, 801 (1995).
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REDISCOVERING PENN CENTRAL

The development of the law of regulatory takings has some remarkable parallels to the development of the law of procedural due
process. Both bodies of law are oriented around a search for fair
treatment. Both require some kind of language in which lawyers and
judges can construct arguments about fairness in legalistic fashion.
And both have generated three-factor frameworks that have evolved
well beyond their original functions and justifications. In this Part, we
trace the evolution of the law of regulatory takings and relate it to our
prior discussion of due process law. In the next Part, we try to reconstruct regulatory takings law in order better to serve its present doctrinal function.
A.

Some Tahings Fundamentals

The Fifth Amendment contains the injunction, "nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation." 90 The
Fourteenth Amendment has long been construed to contain a similar
injunction.9 ' Perhaps the most devilish problem arising under the
Takings Clause has been determining when property has been "taken"
in the constitutional sense. 92 If the government formally takes title to
property through an official exercise of the eminent domain power,
that is unquestionably a taking of property within the meaning of the
Constitution. But what if the government occupies property without
formally taking title? What if the government effectively destroys
property and thus prevents the nominal owner from occupying it?
What if the government authorizes someone other than the nominal
owner to occupy property? What if the government controls the use
of property rather than its occupancy? In sum, when, if ever, do gov90
91

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
See Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239

(1897).
92 There are also serious issues about the meaning of "property" for purposes of
the Takings Clause, see, e.g., Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and NaturalProperty
Rights, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1549 (2003) (describing a broad conception of protected
property); Molly S. McUsic, The Ghost of Lochner: Modern Takings Doctrine and Its Impact on Economic Legislation, 76 B.U. L. REv. 605 (1996) (describing a narrow conception of protected property), about the requirement that takings occur only for a

"public use," seeJames E. Krier & Christopher Serkin, Public Ruses, 2004 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 859, and about the meaning of 'just compensation," see Christopher Serkin, The
Meaning of Value: Assessing Just Compensationfor Regulatory Takings, 99 Nw. U. L. REV.
677 (2005). But we are concerned here solely with the problem of determining when
property has been "taken" by governmental action.
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ernment regulations that do not formally transfer title ever rise to the
level of constitutional takings?
From the nineteenth century onward, courts have consistently assumed that some governmental actions other than formal transfers of
title can amount to takings of property, 93 though fixing the contours
of that doctrine has proven to be quite challenging. A good harbin94
ger of modern problems arose in 1871 in Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co.
The defendant constructed a dam that effectively flooded a portion of
the plaintiffs land, so that "it worked an almost complete destruction
of the value of the land." 95 The defendant claimed that the dam was
authorized by the State of Wisconsin pursuant to its power to improve
navigation on local rivers. The statute authorizing construction of the
dam made no provision for compensation to injured landowners.
The question was whether the provision in the Wisconsin Constitution
providing that "[t] he property of no person shall be taken for public
use without just compensation therefor" 96 nonetheless required compensation to the plaintiff.
Formal title to the property was never transferred to the defendant or to the State of Wisconsin. The flooding left the plaintiff in
technical possession of the property but destroyed any ability of the
plaintiff to use the land productively. The defendant's argument was
"that there is no taking of the land within the meaning of the constitutional provision, and that the damage is a consequential result of such
use of a navigable stream as the government had a right to for the
improvement of its navigation." 97 If a taking of property occurs only
when title is formally transferred, the defendant was right.
The Court held that the effective destruction of the ability to use
the land constituted a taking, though its reasoning was brief and
conclusory:
It would be a very curious and unsatisfactory result, if in construing a provision of constitutional law, always understood to have
been adopted for protection and security to the rights of the individual as against the government . . . , it shall be held that if the
government refrains from the absolute conversion of real property
to the uses of the public it can destroy its value entirely, can inflict
irreparable and permanent injury to any extent, can, in effect, subject it to total destruction without making any compensation, be93 See Claeys, supra note 92; Kris W. Kobach, The Origins of Regulatory Takings:
Setting the Record Straight, 1996 UTAH L. REv. 1211.
94 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871).
95 Id. at 177.
96 WIs. CONST. art I, § 13.
97 Pumpelly, 80 U.S. at 177.
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cause, in the narrowest sense of that word, it is not taken for the
98
public use.
But once the word "taken" is understood to extend beyond actions
that transfer title, the question becomes how far it extends. Does it
extend only to extreme cases of total destruction of use and value, as
in Pumpelly? Does it extend to every governmental action that reduces
the value of someone's property? Is there some identifiable point in
between these extremes at which destruction or regulation crosses
over into a constructive taking of property? The Pumpelly Court fully
recognized the nature of the problem that its holding generated:
We are not unaware of the numerous cases in the State courts
in which the doctrine has been successfully invoked that for a consequential injury to the property of the individual arising from the
prosecution of improvements of roads, streets, rivers, and other
highways, for the public good, there is no redress; and we do not
deny that the principle is a sound one, in its proper application, to
many injuries to property so originating. And when, in the exercise
of our duties here, we shall be called upon to construe other State
constitutions, we shall not be unmindful of the weight due to the
decisions of the courts of those States. But we are of opinion that
the decisions referred to have gone to the uttermost limit of sound
judicial construction in favor of this principle, and, in some cases,
beyond it, and that it remains true that where real estate is actually
invaded by superinduced additions of water, earth, sand, or other
material, or by having any artificial structure placed on it, so as to
effectually destroy or impair its usefulness, it is a taking, within the
meaning of the Constitution, and that this proposition is not in conflict with the weight of judicial authority in this country, and certainly not with sound principle. Beyond this we do not go, and this
99
case calls us to go no further.
And with that acknowledgment, modern law was set on a course from
which it has not yet wavered. Once the word "taken," whether in the
Fifth Amendment or the Wisconsin State Constitution (and the Court
in Pumpelly clearly viewed those provisions as equivalent 0 0 ), is held to
include actions other than title transfers,10 1 there needs to be some
98 Id. at 177-78.
99 Id. at 180-81.
100 See id. at 176-77.
101 Cases subsequent to Pumpelly made it very clear that title transfer was not essential to a taking. The Court extended Pumpelly's holding concerning the flooding of
lands to federal action, see United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445, 470 (1903) ("While
the government does not directly proceed to appropriate the tide, yet it takes away
the use and value; when that is done it is of little consequence in whom the fee may
be vested."), and further extended it to circumstances in which the flooding merely
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mechanism for determining when those actions cross the line from
incidental consequences of lawful government action to effective takings of property requiring compensation.
The Court most famously addressed this question in 1922 in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.10 2 The plaintiff coal company in 1878
had conveyed away the surface rights to some of its coal mining lands
but had expressly reserved the right to mine without regard to any
damage to the surface. The Pennsylvania legislature in 1921, however,
prohibited the mining of anthracite coal in a manner (with some exceptions) that would cause subsidence of a human habitation. The
statute was challenged as an unconstitutional taking of the coal company's property, 10 3 though there was obviously no formal transfer of
title of any property to the state or any other individual.
The Court held the statute unconstitutional, concluding that
"[t] he general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to
a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking." 10 4 As in Pumpelly, the reasoning was vague and somewhat
conclusory. "Government hardly could go on," wrote the Court, "if to
some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law." 10 5 Though not
every loss in value or use rights attributable to governmental action is
a taking, the Court recognized that the principle that property can be
harmed without compensation "must have its limits.'

0 6

In defining those limits, the Court considered a number of factors. The Court stated that "[o]ne fact for consideration in determining such limits is the extent of the diminution. When it reaches a certain
magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an exercise of
eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act. So the question depends upon the particular facts." 10 7 The Court at several
reduced by half the value of the land but did not destroy it entirely; see United States
v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 327-28 (1917). Later decisions swept in use regulations as well.
See Chi., R.I. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 284 U.S. 80, 96 (1931) ("Confiscation
may result from a taking of the use of property without compensation quite as well as
from the taking of the title.").
102 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
103 To be precise, the statute was challenged as a violation of the Contracts Clause
and the Due Process Clause. It had already been established by 1922, however, that
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause effectively "incorporated" the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
104 Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415.
105 Id. at 413.
106

Id.

107

Id. (emphasis added).
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points suggested that the extent of the public interest was relevant,10 8
though it suggested elsewhere that even a strong public interest would
not obviate the need for compensation. 10 9 A previous decision had
approved a requirement that pillars of coal be left in the ground as
support; 1 10 that decision was distinguished because it involved "a requirement for the safety of employees invited into the mine, and secured an average reciprocity of advantage that has been recognized as a
justification of various laws." 11 1 In the end, the Court concluded that
the inquiry is inescapably "a question of degree-and therefore can'1 12
not be disposed of by general propositions."
The Court's early efforts to define the contours of takings doctrine look very much like the Court's early efforts to define what process is due. The Court was unable to identify a generally controlling
set of principles. Rather, in each particular case, using all-things-considered reasoning, the Court appeared to be seeking the just or fair
result.
This was confirmed in Armstrong v. United States.113 Armstrong
had provided materials to a shipbuilder who was constructing vessels
for the United States, which resulted in some materialmen's liens for
Armstrong under Maine law. The shipbuilder defaulted on its contracts with the United States, and the government subsequently took
title to the uncompleted ships. Armstrong's materialmen's liens
could not be enforced against the United States because of sovereign
immunity. Armstrong accordingly claimed that its liens had been
"taken" because its value had been destroyed. The Supreme Court
agreed. After finding that Armstrong's liens were valid property interests because they had been created before the government held title
to the vessels, 114 the Court held that destruction of the liens was a
taking. The Court acknowledged, as it had in prior decisions, "the
difficulty of trying to draw the line between what destructions of property by lawful governmental actions are compensable 'takings' and
what destructions are 'consequential' and therefore not compensable." 1 15 As it had in Pumpelly and Mahon, the Court announced its
result in conclusory fashion:
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115

Id. at 413-14, 415.
Id. at 415-16.
See Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531 (1914).
Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415 (emphasis added).
Id. at 416.
364 U.S. 40 (1960).
See id. at 44-46.
Id. at 48.
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The total destruction by the Government of all value of these
liens, which constitute compensable property, has every possible element of a Fifth Amendment "taking" and is not a mere "consequential incidence" of a valid regulatory measure. Before the liens
were destroyed, the lienholders admittedly had compensable property. Immediately afterwards, they had none. This was not because
their property vanished into thin air. It was because the Government for its own advantage destroyed the value of the liens, something that the Government could do because its property was not
subject to suit, but which no private purchaser could have done.
Since this acquisition was for a public use, however accomplished,
whether with an intent and purpose of extinguishing the liens or
not, the Government's action did destroy them and in the circumstances of this case did thereby take the property value of those liens
within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. Neither the boats'
immunity, after being acquired by the Government, from enforcement of the liens nor the use of a contract to take title relieves the
Government from its constitutional obligation to pay just compensation for the value of the liens the petitioners lost and of which loss
1 16
the Government was the direct, positive beneficiary.
The Court concluded with the oft-quoted observation that "[t] he Fifth
Amendment's guarantee that private property shall not be taken for a
public use without just compensation was designed to bar the Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which,
17
in all fairness andjustice, should be borne by the public as a whole."'
The emphasis on "fairness and justice" reflects the approach
taken in Pumpelly and Mahon. It also parallels the approach taken by
the Court with respect to constitutionally required procedures under
the Due Process Clauses. The due process inquiry, as we saw, is a
search for fundamental fairness, with the Court unable, because of the
nature of the inquiry, to formulate clear rules for general guidance in
future cases. The Court's early efforts to define regulatory takings
(that is, takings that do not transfer title to property) follow the same
pattern: the Court was searching for fair results and was unable to
identify general principles that would guide that inquiry in future
cases. And as with the law of procedural due process, lawyers and
decisionmakers considering regulatory takings problems need to have
a common language with which they can construct legal arguments
about the underlying inquiry.

116
117

Id. at 48-49.
Id. at 49 (emphasis added).
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That is where Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City"18
entered the scene.
B.

The Lingua Franca of Takings Law

In 1968, Penn Central was on the verge of bankruptcy. It owned
Grand Central Terminal in New York City and entered into a longterm lease agreement that involved the construction of fifty-five stories
of office space above the Terminal. The previous year, however, the
Terminal had been declared a landmark under a New York City ordinance, which meant that new construction above the Terminal required approval by the City's Landmark Commission. The
Commission refused to approve the plan (and gave every indication
that it would refuse to approve just about any plan), and Penn Central
asserted that the City had therefore taken the air space above its Terminal without just compensation.' 19
Penn Central won on its takings claim in the New York trial court
but lost in the intermediate appellate division and, ultimately, in the
New York Court of Appeals. In the Supreme Court, the brief for the
appellee Landmark Commission contained the following observation:
Where the land use regulation is within the police power, the
validity of the regulation will depend on an examination and balancing of three elements: the importance of the regulation to the
public good, the reasonableness with which the regulation attempts
to achieve that good and whether the restriction on the parcel ren120
ders it economically unviable.

121
The brief traced this three-factor framework to a prior decision.
The argument for appellant Penn Central did not directly challenge this framework but instead concentrated its fire on the New
York Court of Appeals' decision, which had relied on a novel theory
that no one defended in the Supreme Court. 2 2 Penn Central treated
the ultimate issue as a straightforward syllogism: air rights are property; New York deprived Penn Central of the use of its air rights; therefore, New York took Penn Central's property.

118 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
119 Id. at 115-20. Or, at least, that is what Penn Central argued in the Supreme
Court. For a full account of the Penn Central litigation, see Kanner, supra note 8.
120 Brief for Appellee at 16, Penn Cent., 438 U.S. 104 (No. 77-444), 1978 WL
206883.
121 See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594-96 (1962).
122 The New York Court of Appeals disallowed compensation for any component
of property value that was attributable in some fashion to social factors rather than to
individual investment. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 366 N.E.2d 1271,
1275-76 (N.Y. 1977), affd, 438 U.S. 104.
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The Supreme Court upheld the City's landmark ordinance, in an
opinion that shares many features with the opinion in Mathews v. Eldridge. As in Mathews, the Court began by observing that "l[t] he question of what constitutes a 'taking' for purposes of the Fifth
123
Amendment has proved to be a problem of considerable difficulty"
and that the ultimate inquiry focuses on fairness and justice to the
parties. 1 24 The Court frankly acknowledged that it had thus far "been
unable to develop any 'set formula' for determining when 'justice and
fairness' require that economic injuries caused by public action be
compensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons"'125 and that the outcome in a
takings case "depends largely 'upon the particular circumstances [in
1' 2 6
that] case.''
As in Mathews, the Court in Penn Central then identified "several
factors that have particular significance" 127 for making "these essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries" 128 concerning basic fairness. The
Court explained:
The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and,
particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with
distinct investment-backed expectations are, of course, relevant considerations. So, too, is the character of the governmental action. A
"taking" may more readily be found when the interference with
property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government
than when interference arises from some public program adjusting
the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common
29
good. 1
The Court then devoted fourteen pages of the United States Reports
to a detailed description and rejection of Penn Central's arguments.1 30 The Court's discussion ranged widely over past precedents,
the proper characterization of the property interest at stake, the role
of expectations and diminishment of value in takings analysis, and the
particularized effect of New York's landmark law on Penn Central's
property. But the opinion did not give any indication that it viewed
the paragraph quoted above as a test, much less an outcome-determi123 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 123.
124 See id. (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
125 Id. at 124.
126 Id. (quoting United States v. Cent. Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168
(1958)).
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id. (citations omitted).
130 See id. at 124-37.
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native test, for assessing regulatory takings. The structure of the
Court's argument did not follow the analysis set forth in the quoted
paragraph, nor did the Court specifically relate its subsequent detailed discussion to the factors mentioned in the paragraph. More
pointedly, to the extent that the Court in Penn Central identified discrete factors for consideration, it identified two, rather than three,
such factors: (1) the impact of the challenged regulation on the claimant, viewed in light of the claimant's investment-backed expectations
and (2) the character of the governmental action, viewed in light of
the principle that actions that closely resemble direct exercises of eminent domain are more likely to be compensable takings than are garden-variety land use regulations. Someone who knew nothing of
modern takings law would be, to say the least, hard pressed to distill a
discrete three-factor analysis from the opinion in Penn Central.
In sum, the reference in Penn Centralto various factors appears to
be nothing more than the Court's application of the analysis outlined
in the appellee's brief-just as there was nothing in Mathews to suggest that the Court was doing anything other than incorporating the
analysis of the government litigators into its opinion. There is no reason to think that the Court itself viewed Penn Central as a major analytic turning point in takings law. 31 Nor is there any reason to think
that the Court in Penn Centralthought that it was crafting a framework
with three distinct factors. Two, perhaps, but certainly not three.
C.

MisunderstandingPenn Central

As with Mathews, the Court's subsequent decisions did not immediately treat Penn Centralas having set forth an outcome-determinative
test for regulatory takings cases. In 1979 in Andrus v. Allard,I3 2 the
Court's first major takings decision following Penn Central, the Court
did not treat Penn Central as having set forth any kind of controlling
1 34
analysis. 13 3 Later that term, the Court in KaiserAetna v. United States
repeated much of the discussion from Penn Centralbut distilled it into
131 The law clerks and lawyers who worked on the case confirm this impression.
See Looking Back, supra note 7, at 305-06.
132 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
133 See id. at 65.
Penn Central TransportationCo. v. Nezw York City is our most recent exposition on the Takings Clause. That exposition need not be repeated at length
here. Suffice it to say that government regulation-by definition-involves
the adjustment of rights for the public good. Often this adjustment curtails

some potential for the use or economic exploitation of private property. To
require compensation in all such circumstances would effectively compel the
government to regulate by purchase. "Government hardly could go on if to

2005]

"OH

LORD,

PLEASE DON'T

LET ME

BE MISUNDERSTOOD!"

33

the now familiar three-factor analysis that encompasses "the economic
impact of the regulation, its interference with reasonable investment
backed expectations, and the character of the governmental action.135 Thus, it was Kaiser Aetna that first split the economic impact
on the claimant apart from the claimant's investment-backed expectations, combined those elements with the character of the government
action, and presented the three-part package as a distinct framework.
What we know today as the Penn Central three-part framework is really
the Kaiser Aetna three-part framework. In any event, Kaiser Aetna
merely identified those three considerations as having "particular significance" 136 ; it did not represent them as definitive.
Interestingly, the first use of the Penn Central formulation as a
full-fledged test appears to have come in Loretto v. TeleprompterManhattan CATV Corp.,'13 7 in which the Court relied on the "character of the
governmental action" to establish that direct physical occupations of
property by the government, either directly or through authorization
138
to third parties, are takings regardless of any other considerations.
In the eyes of the Court, permanent physical occupations so closely
resemble formal transfers of title that no further inquiry is necessary
in order to establish a taking. Two years later, in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 1 3 9 the Court again focused on a single factor as determinative-in this case finding that Monsanto had no "reasonable
investment-backed expectations" that certain information disclosed to
40
the Environmental Protection Agency would be kept confidential.1
some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without
paying for every such change in the general law."
The Takings Clause, therefore, preserves governmental power to regulate, subject only to the dictates of "justice and fairness.'" There is no abstract or fixed point at which judicial intervention under the Takings Clause
becomes appropriate. Formulas and factors have been developed in a variety of settings. Resolution of each case, however, ultimately calls as much for
the exercise of judgment as for the application of logic.
Id. (citations omitted).
134 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
135 Id. at 175.
136 Id.
137 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
138 See id. at 426 ("[W]hen the physical intrusion reaches the extreme form of a
permanent physical occupation, a taking has occurred. In such a case, 'the character
of the government action' not only is an important factor in resolving whether the
action works a taking but also is determinative.").
139 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
140 See id. at 1005-07.
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But these cases were exceptional and revolved around single considerations that dominated in particular circumstances.
As late as 1986, the Court cited the Penn Central factors merely as
helpful tools of analysis that "reinforce[ ] our belief that the imposition
of withdrawal liability [under the Multiemployer Pension Plan
Amendments Act of 1980] does not constitute a compensable taking
under the Fifth Amendment." 141 By 1987, however, for no reason that
is readily apparent, the Court appears to have begun treating the Penn
Central formulation as an outcome-determinative test even in circumstances in which a single factor is not dispositive. 1 42 That is largely
where we have stood ever since and where we stand today. At this
moment in time, the Supreme Court appears to have settled on a twotrack process for identifying when property has been constitutionally
taken. The first track concerns circumstances in which a taking will
be found without elaborate inquiry into more than one factor. If the
government, whether permanently or temporarily, physically occupies
an owner's property or authorizes a third party physically to occupy an
owner's property, the action is a taking within the meaning of the
Constitution without further inquiry. Furthermore, if the government
permanently denies an owner all economically viable use of his land,
that is considered to be essentially a constructive occupation and is
also a taking without further inquiry. 143 On the other hand, regulations that affect possession, use, and disposition rights but that do not
fall within the narrow per se rules for physical or economic takings are
analyzed under the multiple Penn Central factors to determine
whether the Takings Clause has been triggered. That result was not
foreordained by Penn Central. It is not clear that it was even foreshadowed by it.
It does not do justice to academic criticism of Penn Central to describe such criticism as a cottage industry. It is more like an industrial
revolution. More than two decades ago, Carol Rose characterized regulatory takings law as a "muddle,"'14 4 and that characterization has acquired the status of conventional wisdom. 145 Attacks on Penn Central,

141
142
143
144

Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 225 (1986).
See Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 606 (1987).
See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S.

CAL. L. REV. 561 (1984).

145 See Stewart E. Sterk, The FederalistDimension of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence,
114 YALE L.J. 203, 205 (2004) ("Conventional wisdom teaches that the Supreme
Court's takings doctrine is a muddle.").
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146
from every possible direction, would fill several very long footnotes.
Many of the criticisms of modern doctrine are substantive, urging ei-

ther that the Court has overstated 147 or understated 1 48 the extent to

which regulations should be regarded as takings. We do not deal with
those substantive issues in this Article. For our purposes, we take the
underlying substantive law, as it presently stands, as given and focus
on Penn Central as a doctrinal tool. From that perspective, the criticisms of Penn Central that are relevant to our project are jurisprudential
criticisms, of which there are plenty.
At the risk of oversimplifying a body of material too vast for synthesis, the jurisprudential criticisms of Penn Central tend to fall into
two large categories. One set of criticisms focuses on the inadequacy
of the Penn Centralfactors as tools for guiding or predicting decisions;
the factors "are too general to provide much predictability."1 49 This
criticism is trivially true and simply requires us to keep focused on
what the Penn Central framework can and cannot do. Obviously, the
framework cannot dictate or predict outcomes, so people should stop
trying to pretend that it can.
A second set of criticisms focuses internally on the factors themselves. Andrea Peterson has observed that the Court has "defined
each factor in a variety of ways, without acknowledging the shifts in
definition.' 5 0 For example, in employing the "character of the governmental action" factor, the Court has in some cases considered the
seriousness or invasiveness of the governmental action, 15 1 while in
other cases the Court has instead focused on the strength of the gov146

For three relatively brief, but exemplary, footnotes, see Andrew S. Gold, The

Diminishing Equivalence Between Regulatory Takings and Physical Takings, 107

DICK.

L.

REv. 571, 571 n.1 (2003); Poirier, supra note 8, at 97 n.2; Sterk, supra note 145, at 205
n.1.
147 See, e.g., Eduardo Moises Pefialver, Regulatory Taxings, 104 COLUM. L. RE\. 2182
(2004); William Michael Treanor, The Armstrong Principle, the Narratives of Takings,
and Compensation Statutes, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1151 (1997).

148

See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIATE PROPERTY AND
DOMAIN 94-95 (1985); Claeys, supra note 92, at 1669-70.

THE POWER OF

EMINENT

149 Poirier, supra note 8, at 99. For an especially forceful denunciation of the
Court's approach viewed as a decisionmaking methodology, see Gideon Kanner,
Hunting the Snark, Not the Quark: Has the U.S. Supreme Court Been Competent in Its Effort
To Formulate Coherent Regulatory Takings Law?, 30 URB. LAW. 307 (1998).
150 Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying PrinciplesPart IA Critique of Current Takings Clause Doctrine, 77 CAL. L. RE-V. 1301, 1317 (1989).

151 See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716-18 (1987); Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982); see also Peterson, supra note 150, at
1317-18.
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ernment's justification for its action.' 52 Similarly, with respect to the
investment-backed expectations prong, the Court sometimes considers the foreseeability of the government's action, while at other times
focuses exclusively on whether reasonable use of the property remains. 153 The Court also lacks consistency, it is argued, in its application of the economic impact factor. It is unclear whether the crux of
the Court's inquiry focuses on the diminished value of the property or
instead on whether the property has been denied all economically via5
ble use.1 4
This set of criticisms goes to the heart of the ability of the Penn
Centralframework to perform any useful doctrinal or jurisprudential
function. A framework cannot guide conversation if it is so poorly
defined that it does not function as a common frame of reference. It
is also quite different from the set of criticisms generally leveled at the
Mathews framework. Unlike the Mathews critics, commentators on
Penn Central seem largely unconcerned with the possibility that the
Court left out important considerations.1 55 Instead, they find themselves unable to identify what precisely it is that the Court considers
relevant to a takings inquiry and frustrated in their attempts to understand subsequent applications of the factors. By contrast, commentators on Mathews have voiced few complaints about the meaning of the
three factors in the Mathews framework.
This highlights an important difference in the way in which the
Mathews and Penn Central frameworks are constructed. The Mathews
framework contains relatively well understood factors, with an acknowledgment (at least in Mathews itself) that other unnamed factors
might be relevant to a due process analysis. The framework, properly
understood, invites consideration of factors beyond the framework itself. The Penn Central framework, by contrast, looks more like a
framework where the factors identified are exhaustive but are general
and abstract, without clearly marked boundaries on what may be considered. This distinction, characterized by the manner in which the
Court has defined and limited the three factors in subsequent cases,
may explain why the criticisms of the two frameworks have so sharply
diverged.
152 See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485-93
(1987).
153 See Peterson, supra note 150, at 1320.
154 See id. at 1325.
155 But see Treanor, supra note 147, at 1169-72 (urging the Court to focus more
precisely on harm to individual property owners rather than on harm to the property
itself without regard to the circumstances of its owner).
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With Mathews, courts and lawyers have little difficulty understanding and identifying the content of each factor. To be sure, commentators have plenty to say about the subjective nature of the Mathews
framework and the unpredictable way that judges have applied the
factors, but not much criticism has been leveled at the content of the
existing factors. Instead, Mathews's critics, who grasp the meaning of
the existing factors, concern themselves with identifying the factors
that the Supreme Court failed to mention and that lower courts have
subsequently failed to consider. Penn Centra's perceived flaw, on the
other hand, is that the Court failed to inject the factors with any
meaningful content. With broad strokes, the Court painted a vague
outline of the proper takings inquiry. The Court spoke of what is
"reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial public interest, ' 156 "an unduly harsh impact upon the owner's use of the property," 15 7 action that "so frustrate[s]" the owner's expectations as to
amount to a taking, 158 and interests that are "sufficiently bound up"
with reasonable expectations.1 59 This language leaves the meaning of
each factor up for grabs. The breadth of the language may explain
why the Penn Central critics do not waste their breath commenting on
the factors the Court might have excluded. The framework itself is so
loosely defined that judges, when deciding a takings case, appear free
to include whatever considerations they deem relevant under the auspices of whichever factor they so choose.
If the Penn Central framework is truly susceptible to this criticism,
perhaps Professor Echeverria is right that it serves no useful purpose
and should be discarded. If, however, it is possible to give meaningful
content to the Penn Centralframework, either by better understanding
or by reconceptualizing what it seeks to do, the Penn Central framework might have some useful work to do. We think that the Penn
Centralframework can be made to serve a modest function akin to the
function properly served by the Mathews framework. But it requires a
"step backward in time and forward in intelligence." 160
III.

RECONSTRUCTING PENN CENTRAL

The Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed that the law of regulatory takings is fundamentally oriented around fairness to property
156

Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978).

157
158
159

Id.
Id.
Id. at 125.

160

Antonin Scalia, Chairman's Message, Rulemaking as Politics, 34 ADMIN. L.

Summer 1982, at v, xi.

REv.,
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owners adversely affected by regulations. 161 The factors identified as
relevant to the takings inquiry by Penn Central and subsequent decisions are the economic impact of the regulation on the property
owner, the extent to which the regulation interferes with reasonable
investment-backed expectations, and the character of the governmental action. In order to know whether those factors form a good basis
for structuring conversations about ultimate fairness in the context of
regulatory takings, and the extent to which the factors should be recast in some fashion to serve that function better, one must know to
what those factors refer. Gaining such knowledge is no easy task. We
think that it can be made a bit easier by focusing on the original purpose and meaning of Penn Central.
A.

Three Factors in Search of Meaning and Relevance

1. Economic Impact
Justice Holmes in Mahon remarked that "if regulation goes too
far it will be recognized as a taking.

' 162

The most obvious measure of

how "far" regulation goes is the extent to which the regulation
reduces the value of property. Accordingly, one of the factors identified by the Penn Centralframework as relevant to the takings inquiry is
"the economic impact of the regulation. ' 163 It is unclear, however,
just how relevant this factor remains. In Lucas v. South CarolinaCoastal
Council,'6 4 the Supreme Court held that the deprivation of all economically viable use of land is a taking per se. 165 The Court also acknowledged that a partial deprivation of economic value might result
in a taking under a Penn Central analysis. 166 Short of a total deprivation, however, the Court has not identified "a threshold of [economic] impact above which the finding of a taking would occur or
below which the finding of a taking would be precluded.

'167

Only one

thing is certain: even very significant deprivations of economic value,
without more, will fail to establish a taking. 168 This much is clear from
161 See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2074, 2080 (2005).
162 Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
163 Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979).
164 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
165 See id. at 1019.
166 See id. at 1019 n.8.
167 Echeverria, supra note 9, at 5.
168 See Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal.,
508 U.S. 602, 645 (1993) (recognizing that "mere diminution in the value of property,
however serious, is insufficient to demonstrate a taking").
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Penn Central, where the Court cited Hadacheck v. Sebastian169 for the
proposition that even an 87.5% diminution in property value did not
require government compensation. 170 Thus, while in principle diminution in property value can support the finding of a taking, such
diminution, without more, will not suffice to establish a taking unless
1 71
the deprivation of value is absolute.
Of course, a factor can be relevant without being decisive. It is
not at all clear, however, the extent to which a nontotal diminution of
value is even relevant to the takings inquiry under modern law. Certainly, there is no Supreme Court case to which one can point to establish that large but nonabsolute diminutions of value play an
important role in the takings inquiry. Nor is it entirely clear from
what perspective one is supposed to evaluate the economic impact, or
the all-things-considered fairness, of a regulation. Penn Central referred specifically to "[t] he economic impact of the regulation on the
claimant,"172 while KaiserAetna's reformulation of the factors referred
only to the regulation's impact in the abstract. 173 If the loss to a particular claimant is the proper focus of inquiry, then the economic impact would not be measured solely by reference to the loss of value of
the property but instead to the effect of that loss on a specific party.
On that analysis, the status of a regulation as a taking vel non might
depend on the overall circumstances of the claimant, including holdings that are not the subject of the regulation. Indeed, if the ultimate
inquiry focuses on fairness, perhaps the process by which value is lost
is as important as the monetary extent of the loss. Perhaps the relevant factor is not the economic impact of regulation on the claimant
but the variance between that impact and the anticipated or expected
impact of such regulations. In order to understand what the Penn
Central framework means by the ambiguous term "economic impact,"
one must dig a bit deeper. And that leads directly to the second Penn
Central factor.
2.

Reasonable Investment-Backed Expectations

Penn Central clarified that the economic impact of a regulation
should be understood in light of the regulation's effect on "distinct
169 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
170 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 131 (1978).
171 A number of states have adopted statutes that set a threshold of value destruction above which a taking is declared by law. See Treanor, supra note 147, at 1152.
172 Penn Centra4 438 U.S. at 124 (emphasis added).
173 See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979).
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investment-backed expectations." 174 Kaiser Aetna formulated such expectations as a distinct element of the analysis. Far from clarifying the
meaning of the economic impact factor, however, this element adds
its own layer of confusion.
At one level, a focus on "investment-backed" expectations may
support a reading of the Penn Centralframework that directs attention
to the circumstances of a particular claimant. What you are deemed
to have lost may depend on what you put into the property and when.
On the other hand, if one focuses on the word "reasonable" as an
adjective to "investment-backed expectations," a word that was added
by the Kaiser Aetna reformulation of the framework, then perhaps the
inquiry is objective rather than focused on any particular owner. The
problem of how one orients the Penn Central framework is posed, but
not definitively answered, by reference to investment-backed
expectations.
At another level, one must determine what aspects of the factual
and legal background of a regulation appropriately shape the expectations with respect to property. There are two aspects of that background that are of obvious potential significance: the principles of
nuisance and property law that pre-exist the regulation and the preexisting regulatory regime.
a.

The Background Principles of Nuisance and Property Law

The Fifth Amendment only prohibits takings of "property" without just compensation. 175 The government cannot take something
that you never had in the first place. Accordingly, if a government
regulation merely concretizes or reinforces limitations on rights that
were already built into the concept of property, there can be no taking by definition because the property owner has not lost anything
that he or she ever possessed. In order to determine whether the
property owner has anything about which to complain, one must understand the "background" laws of property, such as the law of nuisance, that controlled uses of the owner's property even before the
regulation took effect.
These background principles took center stage in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council.176 South Carolina prohibited all development on coastal land owned by Lucas, 1 7 7 ostensibly to preserve the
174
175
176
177

Penn Centra4 438 U.S. at 124.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-290(A) (West Supp. 2004).
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state's coastline and promote tourism. 178 The Court held that if the
action effectively destroyed all economic value of Lucas's property,
then the action would be considered a taking without further inquiry, 179 unless an analysis of the owner's property right "shows that
1 80
the proscribed use interests were not part of his title to begin with.
A regulation may, without requiring compensation, deprive an owner
of all economically viable use of land when those limitations
inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance already place upon
land ownership. A law or decree with such an effect must, in other
words, do no more than duplicate the result that could have been
achieved ...under the State's law of ... nuisance ....181
Background principles are thus relevant for determining investment-backed expectations in two ways. First, insofar as a contemplated use of property is prohibited by the background principles of
nuisance and property law, that contemplated use cannot be seen as
having been within the landowner's reasonable expectations and its
prohibition can never rise to the level of a constitutional taking. This
much is clear from the Court's discussion in Lucas of a landowner's
title and the rights it represents. Second, in determining the effect of
background principles on the reasonable expectations of a property
owner, courts may sometimes look to areas of law besides nuisance or
property. A case in point is Andrus v. Allard.18 2 In Andrus, the Supreme Court held that Congress could prohibit essentially all commercial traffic in eagle feathers, even eagle feathers that had been
acquired before the regulations took effect.' 83 The decision implied
that Congress, under the Commerce Clause, or a state, under its traditional police power over commercial dealings, may render personal
property worthless insofar as the property's only economic use is "sale
or manufacture for sale." 18 4 This effectively decrees that a person's
"investment-backed expectations" for purposes of the Penn Central
framework are subject to a greater "implied limitation" when dealing
with the sale of commercial items. The relevant "background principles" concerning the scope of property rights may include considerations of regulatory power, the character of the property involved, and
178
179
180
181
182
183
184

Id. § 48-39-250.
See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019.
Id. at 1027.
Id. at 1029.
444 U.S. 51 (1979).
Id. at 58.
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027-28.
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the overall "historical compact recorded in the Takings Clause that
has become part of our constitutional culture."18 5
b.

The Existing Regulatory Framework

The Lucas opinion discussed the nuisance exception only in the
context of a complete deprivation of economically viable use of property. Absent that circumstance, in the more ordinary case where economic value has been reduced but not eliminated, the expectations
measured under the investment-backed expectations factor need not
be grounded exclusively in the background principles of nuisance and
property law. Put another way, Lucas does not by its terms, as part of
an inquiry into investment-backed expectations, foreclose the consideration of regulations that do not form a part of property law's "background principles" in cases that do not involve total deprivations of
beneficial use.
While the consideration of "background principles" is certainly
relevant to a property owner's expectations, Lucas did not rule out the
consideration of regulations that are not themselves "background
principles" of state property law as part of the investment-backed expectations inquiry. One must also consider the effect on the reasonable expectations of property owners of existing land use regulations
that do not merely "duplicate the result that could have been
18 6
achieved . .. under the State's law of ...nuisance."
This problem of accounting for the "existing regulatory framework" has spurred its own controversy, which came to a head in Palaz87
zolo v. Rhode Island.1
The takings claimant in that case, acting as a
corporation of which he was the sole shareholder, acquired three undeveloped adjoining parcels.'
Twelve years after the date of the
purchase, the State of Rhode Island promulgated regulations that des89
ignated a portion of the claimant's property a protected wetland.1
Seven years after the effective date of those regulations, the claimant's
corporation was dissolved and the title to the three parcels passed by
operation of law to the claimant as sole shareholder.1 90
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the claimant was precluded from establishing a taking under either a Lucas theory based
on the deprivation of all economically viable use or a partial taking
185
186
187
188
189
190

Id. at 1028.
Id. at 1029.
533 U.S. 606 (2001).
Id. at 613.
Id. at 614.
Id. at 613-14.
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theory under Penn Central because he had acquired title to the parcels
after the wetlands regulation at issue had been promulgated. 19 1 The
Rhode Island court found that the transfer of title was fatal to the
Lucas claim because the wetlands regulation had become a part of the
background principles of property and nuisance law for purposes of
the Lucas "nuisance exception.

'192

Similarly, the court found that the

transfer of title was fatal to the Penn Central claim because the wetlands regulation had colored the claimant's reasonable expectations
by putting him on notice as to the restrictions operating on the par193
cels at the time title was acquired.
The United States Supreme Court disagreed. Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy held that "a regulation that otherwise would be
unconstitutional absent compensation is not transformed into a background principle of the State's law by mere virtue of the passage of
title. " 1 94 Justice Kennedy reached a similar conclusion with regard to
the Penn Central claim, finding that the claim was "not barred by the
mere fact that title was acquired after the effective date of the stateimposed restriction."'

95

But while this suffices to establish that notice or existence of preexisting regulations does not categorically bar all future takings
claims, it does not establish that notice or existence of pre-existing
regulations is irrelevant for all takings purposes. Justice O'Connor, in
particular, wrote a concurring opinion devoted to the proposition
that the holding in Palazzolo "does not mean that the timing of the
regulation's enactment relative to the acquisition of title is immaterial
to the Penn Central analysis. Indeed, it would be just as much error to
expunge this consideration from the takings inquiry as it would be to
accord it exclusive significance.

19 6

There is good reason to think that Justice O'Connor's view best
represents controlling doctrine. For one thing, without her there was
not a five-Justice majority for the essential holding in Palazzolo. For
another thing, the majority opinion in Tahoe-SierraPreservationCouncil,
191 See Palazzolo v. State ex rel. Tavares, 746 A.2d 707, 715-17 (R.I. 2000), rev'd sub
nom. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606.
192 Id.
193 Id. at 717.
194 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 629-30. Justice Kennedy explained that "[a] regulation
or common-law rule cannot be a background principle for some owners but not for
others." Id. at 630. Rather, "[t]he determination whether an existing, general law
can limit all economic use of property must turn on objective factors." Id.
195 Id. at 630.
196 Id. at 633 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency' 97 referred favorably (if abstractly) to this aspect of Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Palazzolo. 198

And finally, the Federal Circuit has reached conclusions

compatible with Justice O'Connor's reasoning in Commonwealth Edison
Co. v. United States'99 and Rith Energy, Inc. v. United States.200 In Commonwealth Edison, the court acknowledged that "the state cannot defeat liability simply by showing that the current owner was aware of the
20
regulatory restrictions at the time [ ] the property was purchased." '
Citing Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Palazzolo, however, the
court reaffirmed that "the regulatory environment at the time of the
acquisition of the property remains both relevant and important in
judging reasonable expectations." 20 2 Thus, while the court did not go
so far as to find that a previously existing regulatory restriction was
dispositive of the Penn Centralclaim, it nonetheless confirmed that the
Penn Centralanalysis would be informed by the takings claimant's reasonable expectations, as colored by the existence of regulatory restrictions prior to the claimant's acquisition of the land at issue.
In Rith Energy, the Federal Circuit confirmed that the consideration of prior existing regulations was proper for purposes of an investment-backed expectations inquiry. 20 3 Again citingJustice O'Connor's
concurrence in Palazzolo with approval, the Federal Circuit found that
the notice provided by a prior existing regulation remains relevant to
the investment-backed expectations analysis, which is in turn a "long20 4
standing element of regulatory takings analysis" under Penn Central.
To be sure, Justice Scalia, at least, does not believe that the regulatory background should count in either a total takings or a Penn
Central inquiry, 20 5 but thus far he seems to be a minority of one. Ac197 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
198 See id. at 335-36.
199 271 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
200 270 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
201 Commonwealth Edison, 271 F.3d at 1350 n.22.
202 Id.
203 Rith Energy, 270 F.3d at 1350.
204 Id. at 1350-51.
205 For Justice Scalia's views in the partial takings context, see Palazzolo v. Rhode
Island, 533 U.S. 606, 637 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring).
The "investment-backed expectations" that the law will take into account do
not include the assumed validity of a restriction that in fact deprives prop-

erty of so much of its value as to be unconstitutional. Which is to say that a
Penn Centraltaking, no less than a total taking, is not absolved by the transfer

of title.
Id. (citation omitted). For his views in the total takings context, see Nollan v. Cal.
Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 833 n.2 (1987).
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cordingly, the notice provided by the presence of a pre-existing regulation remains one of several factors that must be considered in
determining whether a land use restriction has resulted in a taking
under the Fifth Amendment, though Palazzolo makes clear that consideration of such regulations will not be determinative of a Penn Central claim.
3.

The Character of the Government Action

The Court in Penn Central declared that the "character" of the
government action was relevant to regulatory takings determinations. 20 6 The Court then said in the next sentence that a "'taking'
may more readily be found when the interference with property can
be characterized as a physical invasion by government, than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits
20 7
and burdens of economic life to promote the common good."
What did the Court have in mind by the "character" of the governmental action?
One suggestion is that the Court designed the "character" factor
"to refer to the issue of whether a regulation results in a forced physical occupation of property." 20 8 Perhaps this is what the Court had in
mind, though this is very hard to square with the statement in Penn
Central that a taking can "more readily" be found in the case of a physical occupation, which certainly suggests that physical occupations do
not exhaust the circumstances in which takings can be found. Moreover, the Court had made clear well before the Penn Central decision
that a permanent physical occupation of property was considered a
categorical taking without need for further analysis. If the "character"
of the governmental action is to be part of an ad hoc factual inquiry,
the Court must have had something else in mind.
Perhaps instead the Court meant for the "character" factor to include an inquiry into whether any public interest is served by the regulation. 2°9 The Takings Clause, however, presupposes that any
governmental deprivation of a property interest will be made in the
pursuit of a legitimate public purpose. 2 10 Otherwise, not even just
206 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
207 Id. (citation omitted).
208 Echeverria, supra note 9, at 5.
209 See Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1176 (Fed. Cir.
1994); Echeverria, supra note 9, at 5.
210 See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984) (recognizing that
"one person's property may not be taken for the benefit of another private person
without a justifying public purpose, even though compensation be paid" (quoting
Thompson v. Consol. Gas Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 80 (1937))).
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compensation would save the constitutionality of the regulation at
fault for the deprivation. Thus, the "pursuit of public purpose" inquiry is relevant, not to whether the government action results in a
compensable taking, but instead to whether the government can be
altogether prohibited from promulgating a regulation or acquiring
private property.
A third option is to say that the "character" factor invites consideration of the extent to which a challenged regulation actually serves
the government interests sought to be advanced. This option is now
foreclosed by the Court's decision in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.,211
which categorically declares that asking "whether a regulation of private property is effective in achieving some legitimate public purpose.... has some logic in the context of a due process challenge ....
[b] ut such a test is not a valid method of discerning whether private
property has been 'taken' for purposes of the Fifth Amendment." 2 12
The final, and only plausible, understanding of the "character"
factor is that it is designed to evaluate the extent to which the government action resembles what has been uncontroversially understood to
constitute a taking. This understanding makes good sense, as it is sensible to envision a continuum along which government actions at one
end, such as permanent physical occupations, effect a taking per se
because they closely resemble the formal exercise of the eminent domain power, whereas government actions at the other end, such as
routine land use regulations, almost certainly would not effect a taking. The more closely that a regulatory measure resembles a paradigmatic taking, the more likely that a regulatory taking exists under the
Penn Central framework. This is simple common sense, although it
took the Court a quarter of a century to express it clearly.
B.

RecapturingPenn Central

There is much ground for criticism of the Penn Central framework. The framework contains factors that are not well understood or
well developed. Even if the only function of the framework is to structure discussion, it is questionable whether a framework as poorly defined as the Penn Central formulation appears to be can serve that
function well.
We think that enough order can be brought to the chaos to allow
the Penn Central framework to serve as a vehicle for formal legal discussions of fundamental fairness. The first step in the process is to
recognize that the Penn Central three-factor framework actually started
211
212

125 S. Ct. 2074 (2005).
Id. at 2083-84.
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life as a two-factor framework. It is worth recalling the central paragraph from Penn Central:
The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and,
particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with
distinct investment-backed expectations are, of course, relevant considerations. So, too, is the character of the governmental action. A
"taking" may more readily be found when the interference with
property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government,
than when interference arises from some public program adjusting
the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common
213
good.
This formulation suggests two factors at work: (1) the extent of the
harm suffered by the property owner in view of the owner's investment-backed expectations and (2) the character of the governmental
action in view of the paradigmatic takings status of permanent physical
invasions (or, perhaps even more paradigmatically, formal transfers of
tile). The subsequent decision in Kaiser Aetna split the first factor
into two separate elements, but that was probably a step in the wrong
direction. It is not clear what it means to look at investment-backed
expectations divorced from the overall economic impact of the regulation on the claimant (or vice versa), and case law subsequent to Kaiser Aetna does not stand as a testament to the wisdom of KaiserAetna's
innovation. Instead, a dual focus on the harm to the claimant and the
nature of the governmental action provides a basis for considering any
matters that are plausibly relevant to an overall determination of the
fairness of making a property owner bear the burden of a governmental regulation.
Put simply, we believe that much of the confusion concerning the
meaning of the Penn Central framework has come from the unwise
decision in KaiserAetna to separate the effect of the challenged regulation on the claimant from the claimant's investment-backed expectations. The result has been to render the economic effect on the
claimant essentially irrelevant in all but the most extreme cases of total deprivation of beneficial use. It is hard to see any room in the
existing doctrinal discussions for loss of value short of absolute loss,
and that makes little sense if one is truly concerned about overall fairness. Instead, focus has shifted almost entirely to the element of investment-backed expectations, with chaos the predictable result until
and unless a consensus can be reached-and none seems in viewabout whether the proper focus of attention is the individual property
213 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (citations
omitted).
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owner or the property in the abstract. By returning to the original
Penn Central formulation, attention will be recentered on the actual
impact of the regulation, with the owner's expectations serving a qualifying function in that analysis.
We do not purport here to prescribe how that analysis should
proceed. Is the doctrinally (or normatively) proper focus of inquiry
on a particular property owner who is affected by governmental action
or on the subject property in the abstract? In the first case, one might
want to pay attention to the property owner's overall financial position
and/or pay close attention to the state of the regulatory world when
the owner acquired the property. In the second case, by contrast,
where focus is on the affected property without regard to the contingencies of ownership, there is less cause for considering these particulars. We do not seek to resolve this dispute. Our point here is only
that the Penn Central formulation, as originally constructed in Penn
Central,provides a doctrinal vehicle through which these issues can be
raised and debated and calls for consideration of matters that seem
appropriate to an inquiry into fairness.
A second step in the process of clarifying the appropriate role of
the Penn Centralframework is to specify the domain in which it operates. There are certain governmental actions (other than direct title
transfers) that the Court deems to be takings without further inquiry.
These include permanent physical occupations and complete destruction of economic value of property. In these cases, according to the
Court, no complex, multifaceted arguments about fairness need to be
constructed because the outcome of the inquiry is foreordained. The
scope of this doctrine can best be grasped if one characterizes takings
claims as either total or partialtakings. The concept of total takings is
sometimes conflated with the less inclusive category of physical takings,
perhaps because physical takings have historically been the most common form of total takings. But a total taking, in its broadest sense,
occurs whenever a government action or regulation fully deprives the
claimant of a fundamental property interest.
It is conventional wisdom among property scholars that there is
no set of rights that fundamentally must be part of the concept of
property. The dominant understanding is instead that property is,
quite simply, a bundle of rights protected by the state and that any
bundles put together by the state are equally deserving of the label
"property"-if indeed the label "property" serves any useful analytic
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14

A competing vision, however, maintains that
there are certain basic features of property that form a cohesive, coherent core of the fundamental idea of property: the rights to possess,
use, and dispose.2 1 5 We do not intend here to plunge into this age-old
dispute. 2 16 It is enough for our purposes to observe that the rights to
possess, use, and dispose of property seem to play a central role in the
law of regulatory takings. A total deprivation of any one of these three
basic rights is enough to constitute a taking without further inquiry.
Partial deprivations of these rights call forth the multifaceted Penn
Centralframework. Thus, in Loretto, the Court found a taking without
elaborate analysis where a regulation totally deprived the plaintiff of
the right exclusively to possess her land.2 1 7 In Lucas, the Court found a
taking without elaborate analysis where the regulation at issue totally
deprived the plaintiff of the right to use his land in any economically
meaningful sense of the term "use."2 18 No case of which we are aware
has yet involved a total deprivation of the right to dispose of property,
but Hodel v. Irving,2 1 9 which found a taking when the government deprived Native Americans of the right to pass property by will, suggests
that a stronger interference with the right todispose would likely constitute a taking per se.
These rules concerning per se takings fit elegantly into the Penn
Central framework. If the impact on the claimant is the complete loss
of one of the three bedrock characteristics of property, that impact,
economic or otherwise, is so overwhelming that other considerations
are simply swamped. In other words, there are certain impacts on
private property owners that are so conceptually large that they consti214

For the classic expression of this position, see Thomas C. Grey, The DisintegraPROPERTY 69 (J. Roland Pennock &John W. Chapman
eds., 1980).
tion of Property, in XXII NoMos:
215

See Richard A. Epstein, Property and Necessity, 13 HArrv. J.L. & PUB. POL'v 2

(1990).
216 The dispute may well reduce to the question whether property is pre-political
or post-political, which goes back at least to Blackstone (pre-political) and Bentham
(post-political), but that is a topic for another day. Professor Lawson, however, wishes
gratuitously to express his disagreement with the conventional wisdom and his agreement with the Blackstone/Epstein position on this point.
217 Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435-36
(1982).
218 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015-18 (1992). David Lucas,
of course, was permitted to "use" his land in a sense even under the strictest regulations imposed by South Carolina: he could walk on it, look at it, admire the wildlife,
etc. But a complete or near-complete loss of economic value is a reasonable proxy for
a complete or near-complete right to use the property, as the concept of "use" would
be understood by most ordinary landowners.
219 481 U.S. 704 (1987).
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tute a taking without further inquiry. 22 0 To be sure, the Court in
Loretto seemed to find a taking per se, not because of the nature of the
impact on the claimant, but because of the character of the government action-namely, that a permanent physical occupation looked
very much like a transfer of title. But a better way to understand the
concerns voiced by the Court in Loretto is to identify them as an especially severe impact on the claimant's right to possession rather than
as a function of the kind of governmental action at issue.
Lingle provides a third step in a clarification of the Penn Central
framework by resolving some confusion about the significance of the
character of the governmental action. As Lingle holds, it is self-evidently relevant to a fairness inquiry whether the government is doing
something that looks very much like an exercise of eminent domain
under some other guise or is instead simply doing things that governments have long done without much question.
CONCLUSION

We do not maintain that even the most clearly articulated Penn
Central framework will render the law of regulatory takings clear, or
even comprehensible. It may well be that the entire enterprise is
doomed to failure because there simply is no line to be drawn between formal exercises of eminent domain on the one hand and all
regulations that affect economic value on the other. But American
law has chosen to tread a middle ground for nearly one-and-one-half
centuries. If one takes that choice as a jurisprudential given, and if all
that one expects a framework to do in this context is to provide an
opportunity to address issues rather than to resolve them (or to predict outcomes or tell courts how to reach those outcomes), a properly
understood Penn Centralframework does not fare so badly. For many
220 Of course, in order to determine whether the totality of a feature of property
has been abrogated, one has to define the contours of that feature. This raises the

well-known "denominator problem": when assessing the extent of the impact of a government regulation, what is the baseline ownership interest against which the impact

should be measured? If a regulation deprives a landowner of all of the use of air
rights above a certain level, is that a total taking of use rights, or does one measure the
loss by reference to the rights of the landowner in the entire parcel of land, including
surface and subsurface rights (or perhaps even against the rights of the landowner in
all property that he or she owns, even if that property is not the direct subject of the
challenged regulation)? This problem has bedeviled the Court, see Lucas, 505 U.S. at

1016 n.7, and we offer no solution to it here. The Penn Central framework raises the
problem, provides a vehicle for its exploration, and accommodates any reasonable

answer that one could provide. Frameworks are not supposed to do much more than
that.
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of the same reasons, the analysis in Mathews holds up under scrutiny
better than many scholars credit. Penn Central and Mathews deserve
another look before they are taken out with history's garbage.
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